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Abstract
This paper empirically tests the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis with a
narrative measure of tax shocks. The present value, at the time of legislation,
for tax increases motivated solely by concerns for improving the scal health of
the government is used for the tests. These tax news represent a switch from
debt to tax nancing that should have no eects on the economy if Ricardian
equivalence holds as a good approximation. Such a tax increase seems to have
positive eects on real GDP in the post-1980:IV period. However, this is due to
scal anticipation as many of the tax increases are implemented with substantial
delays and distortionary taxes increase economic activity before taxes go up,
which is caused by intertemporal substitution. Therefore, Ricardian equivalence
is rejected.
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The recent global nancial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crises in Eu-
rope have put scal policy center stage. An important benchmark for scal policy is
the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. It states that it does not matter for the econ-
omy whether government expenditures are nanced by current taxation or instead by
issuing government bonds (Barro, 1974). Ricardian households are only concerned
about the present value of their intertemporal tax liabilities, which are in turn deter-
mined by the present value of the stream of government expenditures and currently
outstanding government debt. The timing of taxes does not matter.1 Government
bonds are simply seen as postponed taxes that will have to be paid at some future
date. Hence, a switch from tax to bond nancing has no eects on macroeconomic
variables. Barro (1974) argued that Ricardian consumers react, keeping the stream
of government spending xed, to an increase in the government decit by increas-
ing savings by an equal amount. The tax cut leads to a dollar-for-dollar increase
in bond holdings. Therefore, neither output nor interest rates change. The same
neutrality argument holds for a switch from bond to tax nancing. The Ricardian
equivalence hypothesis is based on several restrictive assumptions, such as lump-sum
taxes, perfect capital markets where forward-looking households do not face liquidity
constraints and can borrow at the same interest rate as the government, altruistic
operative bequests that link generations, and no uncertainty about the future tax
incidence.
A large number of theoretical and empirical papers have studied Ricardian
equivalence. This literature has been surveyed by Seater (1993) and more recently by
Ricciuti (2003). On a theoretical level, relaxing the very strict assumptions necessary
for Ricardian equivalence can lead to government bonds having either positive or
negative net wealth eects for households, as argued by Barro (1974,1989), instead of
government bonds not being considered net wealth at all under Ricardian equivalence.
For example, Judd (1987) demonstrated this in a theoretical model with distortionary
1Ricardian equivalence does not imply that all scal policy actions have no impact on the real
economy: a change in the present value of government spending aects household net wealth
and therefore household consumption and real output in the economy. Ricardian equivalence is
a Modigliani-Miller theorem for the public sector.
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taxes, nite lives, and adjustment costs. Wealth eects could cancel each other or
be altogether negligible. Therefore, the fact that tax systems are generally not based
on lump-sum taxation does not invalidate Ricardian equivalence, as, for example,
transportation costs do not invalidate the assumption of perfect competition in many
applications. The issue cannot be settled on theoretical grounds. An answer to
whether Ricardian equivalence is a good approximation to reality has to come from
empirical studies.2 This means that the issue of how good of an approximation
Ricardian equivalence is cannot be determine based on theory and empirical tests
are called for. However, the two surveys show that the empirical evidence is not
conclusive at all.
The goal of this paper is to shed new light on the controversial issue of whether
the economy displays Ricardian equivalence features, which is of great relevance in
particular to orienting theoretical models. I suggest a new test of Ricardian equiv-
alence that relies on a narrative measure for a surprise switch from bond nancing
to taxation. Such a switch should have no eects on real GDP and interest rates if
Ricardian equivalence is a good approximation. Furthermore, such a switch leaves the
intertemporal stream of all tax liabilities unchanged because currently outstanding
government bonds have to be paid for with future taxes. A current increase in taxes
that reduces currently outstanding bonds implies an osetting reduction in future
taxes so that in present value terms overall tax liabilities are unchanged. I use for
this purpose the present value of discretionary changes in tax revenue that were moti-
vate by concerns about the inherited government budget decit and were introduced
for reasons unrelated to current macroeconomic uctuations or government spending.
Such a measure has been constructed for United States scal policy, based on the
narrative record, by Romer and Romer (2010).3 They used historical documents to
carefully identify types of legislated tax changes from the motivations provided by
2See also Evans (1991) and Bailey (1993) on further discussions of why Ricardian equivalence
may be a reasonable approximation. Furthermore, Evans et al. (2012) recently showed that rational
expectations are not necessary for Ricardian equivalence to hold and a certain adaptive learning rule
instead can produce equivalence.
3Their measure of discretionary tax news shocks has been used by several others, such as Favero
and Giavazzi (2012), and Mertens and Ravn (2012). Furthermore, the narrative approach was also
used by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011) to study the eects of large U.S. military
build-ups.
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lawmakers at the time of passage, such as the U.S. Congress, Economic Report of the
President, Budget, Senate, Social Security, and Treasury Secretary reports, records,
and bulletins. They call this type of a scal surprise shock (news) an exogenous (as
opposed to endogenous) "decit-driven" tax revenue increase motivated by concerns
about inherited budget decits and not caused by current spending.4
Section 2 describes aspects of the data relevant for my study and Section 3
presents results for the full post-WWII sample and for two sub-samples, one prior
to and the other post 1980:IV. While Ricardian equivalence apparently seems to
hold over the full sample, I show that the regressions over the full sample are not
structurally stable. Once I account for a break in 1980:IV, the prior sample has too
few observations to allow reliable inference. But the post-1980:IV sample delivers
empirical results that show that tax increases that are motivated by dealing with
inherited budget decits have statically signicant eects on economic growth. Ri-
cardian equivalence is therefore not supported by the data. This is a result relevant
for current scal consolidation policies in various countries. The conclusion discusses
further implication of my ndings.
2. Exogenous Tax News Motivated by Decit Reduc-
tion: The Data
Romer and Romer (2010) constructed from scratch in their seminal paper two
"news" series for discretionary tax changes that are unrelated to the business cycle.
One is for tax changes motivated by concerns about long-run economic growth. The
other is for tax changes motivated by concerns about the government budget decit
that are unrelated to the current business cycle. For each of the two series they
construct two measures: one recording the amount of the tax change relative to GDP
when it takes eect; the other recording the present value of the tax change when it
4A closely related study, using Romer and Romer's methodology, was presented by Cloyne (2013)
for the United Kingdom. However, the United Kingdom has no precedents of "scal consolidations,"
dealing with inherited budget decits that are unrelated to the business cycle, as would be neces-
sary for testing Ricardian equivalence. Comparable data are therefore not available for the United
Kingdom.
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is legislated, again as a ratio to GDP. The three-year Treasury bond rate is used for
discounting future tax revenue changes to the time when a measure was passed into
law.5
Romer and Romer (2010) used in their empirical analysis several measures of
exogenous tax news. One is the sum of the decit driven tax changes and the tax
changes motivated by long-run economic growth, at the time of their implementation.
A second and third measure are the two news components in separation: decit-driven
tax changes and long-run tax changes, both at the time of their implementation. A
fourth measure is the present value of the stream of both exogenous tax changes
at the time when they were legislated, instead of actual values at the time of their
implementation as in the rst measure. Romer and Romer did not consider separately
the present values of the decit-driven tax changes.6 I use in this paper the present
values of the nominal decit-driven tax changes at the time when they are legislated,
as percent of nominal GDP.
Most of the decit-driven (exogenous) tax changes were motivated by con-
cerns over the long-run solvency of the Social Security system. For example, the
Social Security Amendments of 1977 and 1983 were major tax increases that did not
simultaneously increase benets. The largest decit-driven tax increases not related
to Social Security were those in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of
1982 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993. There are ten
(nine) quarters with decit-driven exogenous tax changes in the sample period from
1945:I to 2007:IV (1950:I to 2007:IV). This is a considerably larger number than the
four quarterly non-zero observations for the war dummy variable in Ramey (2011).
Figure 1 depicts the present values of decit-driven tax changes as percent of GDP.
The values range from 0.023% in 1997:III to 1.153% in 1977:IV. In comparison, the
non-zero defense build-up dates in Ramey (2011, Table II, pp. 26-27), modelled as
dummies with values of either zero or one, represent the following shares of GDP:
63.06% in 1950:III, 0.33% in 1965:I, 6.36% in 1980:I, and 0.94% in 2001:III. Two of
5Footnote 25 in Romer and Romer (2010, p. 793) provides more details.
6Romer and Romer (2009a) on the other hand studied tax cuts driven by long-run economic
considerations in order to test the hypothesis that such tax reductions lead to decreases in future
government spending.
5
these events show much larger portions of GDP than values in my sample, though
not the remaining ones. In addition, none of the decit-driven dates overlap with the
dates for the present values of long-run exogenous tax changes of Romer and Romer
(2010).
When Ricardian equivalence does not hold, the permanent income hypothesis
predicts that consumers react to news about current or future tax increases (decreases)
by immediately reducing (increasing) consumption. This initial reaction could then
possibly lead to additional dynamics. However, there should be no additional reac-
tion associated with the time when tax liabilities actually take eect if they are not
implemented at the time of being passed into law. The correct approach under the
permanent income hypothesis for dealing with tax news is therefore to use the present
value of tax news at the time when they are announced and to relate output move-
ments to current and lagged values of a measure of news about tax changes. This
scenario holds with lump-sum taxes. On the other hand, in the presence of distor-
tionary taxes when Ricardian equivalence does not hold, intertemporal substitution
predicts an increase in consumption (or investment, depending on the type of tax
used) when the implementation of a tax increase is delayed. In other words, spending
is moved forward in time to take advantage of lower taxes before the tax increase
takes eect. Leeper et al. (2008) refereed to this as scal foresight or anticipation.
In this case, the model needs to account for both the date when the tax change is
announced (legislated) and the dates when it is implemented.
When Ricardian equivalence holds, households incorporate the intertemporal
government budget constraint into their permanent income. Ricardian consumers
are forward looking. The tax news measure relevant to them is the present value of
what Romer and Romer (2010) call the exogenous "decit-driven tax changes." This
measure is constructed is such a way that it is orthogonal to all other information
available in a given period.7 It is therefore ideally suited for testing Ricardian equiv-
alence. At the time when the Romer and Romer (2010) tax shocks are announced
(not when they are implemented), there are no associated changes to government
7See Romer and Romer (2010), Favero and Giavazzi (2012), and Mertens and Ravn (2012) on
empirical support.
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spending announced, so that there are no government spending shocks at that time
that are associated with the specic tax news.8 This is exactly the scenario needed
for testing the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, i.e., keeping the expected stream of
government spending xed when the tax news shock hits. If Ricardian equivalence is
a reasonable approximation, news about decit-driven tax increases represent simply
a switch from debt to tax nancing and this news variable should therefore have no
statistically signicant eects on real GDP.
Would Romer and Romer's (2010) tax cuts motivated by concerns about long-
run growth be suitable for testing Ricardian equivalence? The long-run tax-change
variables were constructed so that they are orthogonal to the current business cycle
and current government spending. However, the stated intention of these tax shocks
was explicitly to either decrease the size of the government (e.g., the 1981 Reagan tax
cuts) or to spur productivity growth and increase eciency. This subcomponent of tax
changes, which stimulates long-run growth, is therefore not valid for testing Ricardian
equivalence because there are associated changes in future government spending or in
future income that both aect permanent income. In order to illustrate the Ricardian
case, it is useful to look at a simplied version of the intertemporal government budget




(1 + r)−sREt+s = Bt +
∞∑
s=1
(1 + r)−sGEt+s)− lim
s→∞
(1 + r)−sBt+s,
where REt is real tax revenue in period t, including revenue from monetizing decits
by printing money (which is treated as an ination tax). Bt denotes real government
debt, r is the real interest rate, and GEt stands for real government expenditures
on purchases of goods and services plus transfer payments. It is assumed that the
government does not follow a Ponzi scheme so that intertemporal government budget
8In a regression context this means that such narrative variables are, as long as orthogonality
holds, uncorrelated with other included and other omitted regression variables and their regression
coecient estimates are unbiased. In this case, the only eect of omitted variables is to increase
the residual variance. It is therefore possible to analyze the eects of exogenous tax changes on
economic activity, such as real GDP growth, without specifying an economic model that includes





(1 + r)−sBt+s = 0.
Ricardian households do not change their consumption and savings plans as long
as the present discounted values of expected future tax revenues and of expected
future government spending do not change. The future path of government debt is
irrelevant because all debt has to be ultimately nanced by taxes, as implied by the
above government budget constraint, provided the limit term goes to zero. Decit-
driven tax news t this scenario under our null hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence,
because the tax increases are explicitly targeting a reduction in inherited decits and
therefore lead to less national debt because decits are nanced by issuing debt. Less
national debt means an osetting reduction (in present value terms) in implied future
taxes. Hence, a decit reduction now is a switch from future to current taxation. In
other words, the two dierent time paths of taxes (before and after the decit-driven
tax news) have the same present discounted values.
The stated purpose of decit-driven tax increases is to swap debt for taxes
without changing the stream of government spending. In comparison, long-run tax
cuts are likely to aect the stream of future government spending under our null
hypothesis because the stated intention of lung-run tax cuts is to reduce the stream
of future government spending (reduce the government size) or reduce the tax burden
through stimulating future long-run economic growth and thus increasing the tax
base.9 Therefore, the answer to the above question is no: long-run tax cuts are not
suitable for testing Ricardian equivalence.
The data cover the period from the rst quarter in 1945 to the fourth quarter
in 2007. Following Romer and Romer (2010), I start regressions in 1950:I in order to
allow for sucient lags drawing on observations from earlier quarters. The data for
the narrative measure of exogenous decit-driven tax changes (as percent of GDP),
the real GDP growth rate, the natural logarithm of real GDP, and the three-month
Treasury bill rate are all from Romer and Romer's (2010) data le. The data are
available at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3, along with
9It is straightforward to dene the above intertemporal government budget constraint in terms
of ratios to GDP to illustrate this eect (see, e.g., Hakkio and Rush, 1991).
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RATS software code and a detailed description of the construction of narrative vari-
ables (Romer and Romer, 2009b).
The data were retrieved on 29 October 2013. Regressions were carried out
with the software RATS, version 6.35, based on the original code of Romer and
Romer (2010), except for the CUSUM of squares tests that were done in EViews,
version 8.1. In order to check the accuracy of the code, regressions were repeated
with EViews.
3. Ricardian Equivalence Test Results: OLS and VAR
3.1 Full Sample Period: OLS Without and With Controls for Output
Growth
The rst step in the analysis of Romer and Romer (2010, equation (6), p.
780) is to study the eect of an exogenous tax change on real output growth. Instead
of using total exogenous tax changes, I select the present value of decit-driven tax
changes only:
∆Yt = α +
12∑
i=0
βi∆Tt−i + εt, (1)
where ∆Yt is the log change (growth rate) of real GDP, ∆Tt is the present value of
the stream of tax changes legislated at time t, and εt is a mean-zero Gaussian error
that is orthogonal to all ∆Tt−i by construction of the narrative tax changes. The sum∑j
i=0 βi measures the cumulative scal multiplier from period 0 to period j.
The permanent income hypothesis predicts for tax increases a negative ef-
fect on consumption as expected after-tax real income falls and government bonds
are treated as net wealth under Ricardian non-equivalence so that overall household
wealth falls. This causes additional dynamics that lower real GDP so that βi < 0 for
some or all i. On the other hand, intertemporal substitution predicts, in the presence
of distortionary taxes and Ricardian non-equivalence, an increase in consumption (or
investment, depending on the type of tax used) before the implementation of a tax
increase (assuming there is a delay; hence βi > 0 for periods i till the implementation
date) and a decrease after the tax takes eect (with βi < 0 for periods i after the
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implementation date). In this case, the proper model is one that accounts for both
the date when the tax change is legislated and the date(s) when it is implemented.
In contrast, Ricardian equivalence predicts that the eects on real GDP from such a
decit-driven tax increase should not be statistically signicantly dierent from zero
(all βi = 0).
Figure 2 presents the cumulative eect of a 1% of GDP increase in decit-
driven tax revenue (solid line) on real GDP, estimated with ordinary least squares
(OLS). These are the cumulative multipliers for exogenous decit-driven tax increases.
The eect on real GDP is negative in the rst period and positive thereafter, reaching
a peak of 1.98% ve periods after the tax shock and then declining. Are the eects of
decit driven tax increases statistically signicantly dierent from zero? The answer
depends on the width of the condence bands used in Figure 2. The usual two
standard-error condence band, which is for normally distributed coecient estimates
approximately a 95% condence band, indicates no statistical signicance at any
horizon in Figure 2. Using instead the one standard-error condence band, which is
equivalent to an approximate 68% condence band, gives a dierent picture. Now,
the responses of real GDP are statistically signicantly dierent from zero at horizons
three to eight after the tax shock. The responses are positive so that the tax increase
causes an increase in real GDP at these horizons.
The next step in Romer and Romer (2010) is to include in equation (1) the
lags of GDP growth:






γj∆Yt−j + εt. (2)
The lags of output growth control for the dynamics of GDP and a "multitude of
other inuences" (Romer and Romer, 2010, p. 781). Figure 3 reports the eects
of a 1% of GDP increase in decit-driven taxes on real GDP when lagged output
growth is controlled for in the regression. Overall the eects (cumulative multipliers)
are similar in magnitude to those without controls, though the peak eect is lower.
The two and one standard-error condence bands are calculated from bootstraps with
10,000 replications, following Romer and Romer (2010). The eect in the rst period
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is again negative but remains statistically insignicant for the 95% (two standard-
error) condence band. The 68% (one standard-error) condence band indicates
statistical signicance at the rst horizon, although just barely so. The only other
horizon where there is possibly statistical signicance is the fourth one, but again it
is very much a borderline case.
Romer and Romer (2010) report 68% condence bands. However, Ramey
(2011, footnote 11, p. 11) pointed out that there is "no formal justication" provided
in the literature for using 68% condence bands instead of the usual 95% bands.
Furthermore, it is neither justied on theoretical grounds to use 68% bands.
The empirical evidence over the full sample period would seem to favor the
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis because tax increases intended to reduce inherited
budget decits have no statistically signicant eects on real output at usual con-
dence levels. But, the crucial question is whether the regressions in equations (1) and
(2) are structurally stable over the sample period.
The cumulative sum (CUSUM) of squares test is based on squared recursive
residuals that are calculated from sequentially increasing samples, starting with the
rst thirteen observations in our case up to the full sample size. This test was proposed
by Brown et al. (1975). The test provides an indication of parameter or variance
instability in the case of unknown break dates. Figures 4a and 4b depict the values
of the CUSUM of squares statistic along with the upper and lower 5% signicance
lines. Test statistic values outside the area between the two signicance lines mark
the time periods when structural change likely occurred. For both Figures 4a and 4b,
calculated from equations (1) and (2), the time interval of structural change includes
the year 1980. I therefore follow Romer and Romer (2010), among many others, and
split the sample into a period prior to 1980:IV and post-1980:IV.
3.2 The Prior- and Post-1980:IV Periods: OLSWithout and With Controls
for Output Growth
Figure 5a shows for equation (2) the cumulative eect of a 1% of GDP increase
in decit-driven tax revenue on GDP, in the sub-sample period 1950:I to 1980:IV. The
eect on real GDP is not statistically signicant whether the bootstrapped 95% or
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68% condence bands are used, except for the rst period. The condence bands are
quite wide indicating that the coecients are not estimated very precisely. This is
not surprising because there are only three news shocks (tax changes) in this sample
period.
Figure 5b presents for equation (2) cumulative eects of a 1% of GDP in-
crease in decit-driven tax revenue on GDP in the post-1980:IV period from 1981:I
to 2007:IV. The response to a tax increase is positive and statistically signicant from
period four to nine after the impact for the bootstrapped 95% condence band. The
impact reaches a peak of 4.72%, i.e., the multiplier peaks at a positive value of 4.72.
3.3 The Prior- and Post-1980:IV Period: A VAR With Tax Shocks, Real
GDP and an Interest Rate
An alternative model specication to single equations is a VAR. The three-
variable VAR consists of the narrative decit-driven present value of the tax shock
as a percent of GDP, the log of real GDP and the three-month Treasury bill rate
in percent. Following Romer and Romer (2010), I use 12 lags on each variable and
order them for the Cholesky decomposition with the tax shock rst, followed by real
GDP and then the Treasury bill rate last. This ordering allows for tax changes to
aect output contemporaneously but output shocks and interest rate shocks have no
contemporaneous, i.e., within the same quarter, eects on tax changes. The interest
rate responds contemporaneously to all shocks. There are no restrictions on lagged
responses of variables to shocks. The appeal of the VAR approach is that it allows
for rich endogenous dynamics that follow unexpected scal policy changes.
Mertens and Ravn (2014) reconciled the dierent estimates of tax multipliers
in narrative approaches, such as in Romer and Romer (2010), with those derived
from structural VAR models as pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and ap-
plied by many others, among them Favero and Giavazzi (2012), who combined the
narrative approach with the VAR. Mertens and Ravn (2014) showed that the lower
estimated tax multipliers in structural VARs can be explained by output elasticities
of tax revenues, plugged into such models, that are lower than supported by em-
pirical evidence, or by not accounting for measurement errors of narrative measures
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when they are embedded in "proxy" VARs. They found support for tax multipliers of
the size as calculated from models used by Romer and Romer (2010) with narrative
measures.
Figure 6a shows the cumulative impulse response of real GDP to a decit-
driven tax shock in the sample prior to 1980:IV. It is negative and statistically signif-
icant initially, in the rst period, then becomes positive afterwards but is no longer
statistically signicant at 95% bootstrapped condence intervals. The bootstrapped
68% condence band paints a similar picture with somewhat borderline signicance
in periods seven and eight. The band is quite wide and, consistent with the single
equation regression results, reveals imprecise estimation.
Figure 6b is for the post-1980:IV period and the cumulative eect of a 1% of
GDP decit-driven tax increase. The eects on real GDP are positive throughout
the impulse horizon considered. At the 95% bootstrapped condence band, the tax
increase leads to an increase in real GDP that is statically signicant from period
three to eight and peaks at a value of 3.11 in period six after the tax shock. Again,
the results are similar to those with the single equation regressions from before.
3.4 The Role of Fiscal Anticipation in the Post-1980:IV Period
One possible explanation of the apparent positive scal multipliers in response
to a tax increase is the intertemporal substitution eect due to lags in implementing
tax increases for the post-1980:IV period. The eect of the announcement of a tax
increase in future quarters (instead of an immediate increase at the time of the an-
nouncement) will lead to increases in spending before the tax increase takes eect,
whether through direct eects or through increased work hours when payroll taxes
are involved. For this argument to hold, taxes are not assumed to be lump-sum but
distortionary. In order to explore this possibility, I separate out decit-driven tax
changes that are implemented with a delay of one or more quarters and therefore be-
come anticipated in quarters after the announcement. The remainder of decit-driven
tax change announcements are news or shocks and unanticipated. Following the same
procedure as explained in Mertens and Ravn (2012) but applied to decit-driven tax
changes instead, I run separate regression for unanticipated and anticipated decit-
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driven tax changes.
Figure 7a reports the cumulative multipliers for an unanticipated decit-driven
tax shock in the post 1980:IV period. As one would expect based on standard theory,
the eects on real GDP are negative at all horizons. The largest negative eect occurs
in the third quarter after the impact and the multiplier reaches a value of -1.67,
however, all multiplier estimates are insignicant at the usual 5% level. Estimates
are too imprecise to draw further conclusions on the size of the tax multiplier when
tax shocks are unanticipated. This is due to the small sample size with only ve
observations. More observations on tax shocks would be needed to reduce the width
of the condence bands and to calculate reliable multiplier estimates.
Figure 7b graphs the responses of real GDP to an anticipated change in taxes
in the post-1980:IV period. If intertemporal substitution was happening, one would
expect positive eects of announced tax increases on real GDP. Indeed, Figure 7b
shows positive cumulative multipliers from three quarter onwards and the multipliers
are statistically signicantly dierent from zero in quarters ve to twelve after the
impact.10 The cumulative multiplier reaches a maximum value of 2.53 in quarter ten.
The estimates are relatively precise, given that I have a sample with 12 observations
on anticipated tax shocks in the post-1980:IV period. These results are consistent
with intertemporal substitution due to scal anticipation or foresight as argued by
Leeper et al. (2008). Furthermore, Ricardian equivalence is hence not supported by
data using the narrative record on tax changes.
4. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on scal policy by using a
part of a narrative measures developed by Romer and Romer (2010) in order to pro-
vide new empirical evidence on the validity of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.
Ricardian equivalence may be a good approximation to reality and the fact that taxes
are generally not lump-sum does not necessarily invalidate it, as shown for example by
Judd (1987) in a theoretical model with distortionary taxes, nite lives, and adjust-
10Using instead a VAR as in Section 3.3 leads to similar results.
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ment costs. The data set of Romer and Romer (2010) identied two sub-categories of
tax shocks: measures to address inherited budget decits and long-run measures to
improve economic performance. Romer and Romer (2009a, 2010) did not study the
eects of the decit-driven sub-category that I examine in this paper. By doing so, I
shed new light on an unresolved empirical question: how good of an approximation
is Ricardian equivalence for scal policy? Ricardian equivalence questions that ag-
gregate demand can be stimulated with tax cuts, all else the same, if forward-looking
taxpayers take into account the implications of today's tax cuts, nanced by borrow-
ing, on taxes in the future. The Ricardian argument applies in reverse as well: if
governments consolidate their budgets by increasing taxes, all else the same, in order
to reduce government debt, which lowers future taxes, no negative aggregate demand
eects follow this action because the intertemporal tax burden is unchanged.
The empirical results do not support the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis
because the eects of a tax increase, keeping government spending xed, have a sta-
tistically signicant inuence on real GDP. The results are robust to the specication
of the model either as a single equation or as a vector-autoregressive system. While
Ricardian equivalence seemed to be supported at rst sight over the full post-WWII
sample period, I nd that this result does not hold up when I split the sample in
1980:IV. The post-1980:IV sample allows for precise inference that shows that in-
creasing taxes solely motivated by concerns over the health of the scal position of
the government has a statistically signicant positive eect on real GDP for antici-
pated tax increases, as predicted by the theory of scal anticipation of Leeper et al.
(2008) when tax increases are implemented with delays of several quarters. Intertem-
poral substitution in the presence of distortionary taxes explains these eects. The
increase in economic activity ahead of the implementation of a tax increase therefore
comes at the expense of lower economic activity after the implementation of the tax
increase. It may well be that the eects of deviations from Ricardian equivalence
are overall small, as argued by Evans (1993). Assessing the quantitative eects after
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FIGURE 2. Estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax increase of 1%
                  of GDP on GDP, as in equation (1) with no controls for lagged GDP
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FIGURE 3. Estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax increase of 1%
                  of GDP on GDP, as in equation (2) with controls for lagged GDP growth
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FIGURE 4a. Structural change test of the GDP growth regression with no controls
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FIGURE 4b. Structural change test of the GDP growth regression with controls
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FIGURE 5a. Prior-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax
                    increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, as in equation (2) with controls
                    for lagged GDP growth and one and two standard-error
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FIGURE 5b. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax
                    increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, as in equation (2) with controls
                    for lagged GDP growth and one and two standard-error
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FIGURE 6a. Prior-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax
                    increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, in a VAR with 3 variables
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FIGURE 6b. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax
                    increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, in a VAR with 3 variables
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FIGURE 7a. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an unanticipated exogenous deficit-driven
                    tax increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, with one and two standard-error
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FIGURE 7b. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an anticipated exogenous deficit-driven
                    tax increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, with one and two standard-error
                    confidence bands
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